Mobile phone infrastructure development : lessons for the development of a hydrogen infrastructure by Hardman, Scott & Steinberger-wilckens, Robert
 
 
University of Birmingham
Mobile phone infrastructure development : lessons
for the development of a hydrogen infrastructure
Hardman, Scott; Steinberger-wilckens, Robert
DOI:
10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.03.156
License:
Creative Commons: Attribution (CC BY)
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Hardman, S & Steinberger-wilckens, R 2014, 'Mobile phone infrastructure development : lessons for the
development of a hydrogen infrastructure', International Journal of Hydrogen Energy, vol. 39, no. 16, pp. 8185-
8193. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.03.156
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
Eligibility for repository : checked 03/06/2014
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
ww.sciencedirect.com
i n t e r n a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 1 8 5e8 1 9 3Available online at wScienceDirect
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/heMobile phone infrastructure development: Lessons
for the development of a hydrogen infrastructureScott Hardman*, Robert Steinberger-Wilckens 1
Centre for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Research, Chemical Engineering, University of Birmingham,
Birmingham B15 2TT, UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 18 January 2014
Received in revised form
18 March 2014
Accepted 21 March 2014
Available online 18 April 2014
Keywords:
Hydrogen
Fuel cell
Infrastructure
Mobile phone
Telecommunication* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ44 (0) 121 414
E-mail address: sxh993@bham.ac.uk (S. H
1 Tel.: þ44 (0) 121 4148168.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhydene.2014.03.156
0360-3199/Copyright ª 2014, The Authors. Publishe
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licensea b s t r a c t
The development of new infrastructure is often a consideration in the introduction of new
innovations. Currently there is some confusion around how to develop a hydrogen infra-
structure to support the introduction of FCVs. Lessons can be learned from similar tech-
nology introduction in the past and therefore this paper investigates how mobile phone
infrastructure was developed allowing the mass-market penetration of mobile phones.
Based on this successful infrastructural development suggestions can be made on the
development of a hydrogen infrastructure. It is suggested that a hydrogen infrastructure
needs to be pre-developed 3e5 years before the market introduction of FCVs can suc-
cessfully occur. A lack of infrastructural pre-development will cause to the market intro-
duction of FCVs to fail.
Copyright ª 2014, The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Hydrogen Energy
Publications, LLC. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).Introduction
The development of infrastructure to support new technolo-
gies and products is an integral aspect in the introduction of
innovations.Many innovationswould be uselesswithout their
associated infrastructure. A clear example of this is Fuel Cell
Vehicles (FCVs). There is great interest in the development of
hydrogen infrastructure to support FCV market entry [1e4].
Many case studies aim at solving some of the current issues of
infrastructural development by investigating historical cases.
Previous studies use the example of how internal combustion
engine (ICE) vehicle infrastructure was developed in the late
1800s and early 1900s [5,6]. However, these examples are less
helpful to the current situation. One reason for the success of
the ICE was due to there being an existing petroleum supply
network. This network supplied petroleum for lighting and for5283.
ardman).
d by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of
s/by/3.0/).stationary petrol generators, as well as the farming industry
[5]. This meant that ICE outcompeted BEVs and steam engine
vehicles precisely because infrastructure was already present.
The availability of infrastructure was a compelling reason to
purchase an ICE vehicle over competitive vehicles. This
example can be useful to some new automotive technologies;
for example, BEVs can make use of existing domestic elec-
tricity supplies, albeit with lower charge rates. FCVs require a
totally new refuelling infrastructure. Furthermore, hydrogen
is a commodity that is not supplied by the current transport
fuel industry but by specialised companies. These might see
new business opportunities and become new players within
the automotive fuel industry. This means that the example of
the development of petroleum supply networks is less helpful.
What is needed is an example of a new infrastructure being
developed to support an innovation that had no prior infra-
structure available. Fortunately, a very instructive exampleHydrogen Energy Publications, LLC. This is an open access article under the
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Fig. 1 e Global Mobile Phone Subscriptions per 100 people [13].
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structure. The mobile phone was a disruptive innovation
heavily reliant upon infrastructure for it to gain success. FCVs
share this characteristic as they are a potentially disruptive
innovation [7] and are heavily reliant upon infrastructure.
Understanding how mobile communication networks
were developed will allow us to learn exactly how new infra-
structure is implemented and how the decision to heavily
invest can be made; the hope is that these lessons can be
applied to any disruptive or innovative infrastructure. The
results here can be used to convince stakeholders to invest in
hydrogen infrastructure. This paper will show that pre-
development of infrastructure is vital to the successful intro-
duction of any innovations requiring totally new infrastruc-
ture. This is highlighted by the fact that network development
began 5 years before the first mobile phone was sold to the
public.
Disruptive innovation
The mobile phone was a disruptive innovation; this can be
confirmed using the 3-point disruptive technology criteria.
The criteria states that innovations are disruptive innovations
if they require new infrastructure, are produced by new
market entrants and not incumbents, and provide a greater
level of service to the end users [7]. The mobile phone is
aligned well to the three criteria. Clayton Christensen, the
founder of disruptive innovation theory, also states that
mobile phones are a disruptive innovation to land line tele-
phones [8]. Mobile phones had clear added functionality overN
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Fig. 2 e UK Mobile Phone Subscriptions per 100 people; note tha
This is because many people have more than one phone, or SIlandline phones; this functionality did however come at a
high price. But with economies of scale and technological
improvements handset unit costs were continually reduced
and in around 30 years the mobile phone went from high cost
low volume series in niche markets to occupying the whole
landscape and achieving an enormous mass-market share
(see section 1.2).
When the team at Motorola headed by Martin Cooper
invented the mobile phone [9], it created a newmarket sector.
The mobile phone had clear added value. The mobile phone
met an existing need: it became possible to instantly
communicate regardless of location, and be able to contact
people in the event of an emergency situation. The mobile
phone provided convenience greater than any other commu-
nication technology did before. Land lines, phone booths and
pagers could not meet these needs. The cost of using a mobile
phone far exceeded the costs of communication via landline,
but people were willing to pay due to the added convenience.
One further reason the mobile developed added value was
thanks to it becoming a status symbol [10].
Mobile phones generate revenue at the point of sale, and
provide continuous revenue in the form of service charges
throughout their use. By 2015 the globalmobile phone handset
market is expected to reach $340 billion [11]. The extent of
market penetration of mobile phones is vast. Globally there
are 85 phone subscriptions per 100 people. In developed
countries like the UK 39% of people own a smart phone and
there are more phone subscriptions than inhabitants. 52% of
voice communications are nowmade via a mobile phone [12].
Figs. 1 and 2 show the global and UK increases in phone94 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
t there are more subscriptions than inhabitants in the UK.
M card [13].
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of the mobile phone market. In the UK it can be seen that
growth has begun to slow and the market may have almost
reached saturation. The recent global growth trend in mobile
phone subscriptions is being maintained by emerging
economies.
Rapid product development
The first mobile phone calls weremade from cars in the 1940s,
these calls were made from a devices weighing around 35 kgs.
The first trulymobile phone call wasmade in 1973, it was done
using a hand held device invented by Motorola. In 1983
Motorola launched its DynaTac mobile phone to the market,
this was the first commercial mobile phone. The device cost
around $4000 [14]. These phones worked off the first-
generation (1G) network. It was not until the arrival of
second-generation GSM technology and thanks to lower
priced handsets that mobile phones really began penetrating
mass markets. The development of the mobile phone
occurred at a rapid pace; mobile handset weight was contin-
ually reduced from close to 800 g to less than 160 g in only 20
years (Fig. 3). At the same time the price of handsets fell from
over £2500 to less than £250 (Fig. 4). Costs have in recent years
begun to rise due to increasing functionality through added
capabilities. It is remarkable that handsets were continually
improved and at the same time cost reductions were
achieved.1000000Infrastructural investment
Mobile phone use would not be possible without the devel-
opment of infrastructure. Consumers would not purchase a
device that could not be used. As with FCVs there was a need
to make a decision to invest in infrastructure before the
market entry of the product could begin. The decision to
invest is not an easy one, as the economic incentives to
develop an infrastructure that currently has no customers are
hard to identify. Nevertheless, without the development of
infrastructure any technology reliant upon it will surely fail.
Mobile phone infrastructure has been continually developed
over the past 4 decades. An overview of the increase in
network capabilities can be seen in Fig. 5 as measured by
download rates, also know as band rates.P
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Fig. 3 e Phone handset weight from 1983-Present [15e37].Early introduction (0G)
0G networks predated mobile phone networks and were
designed to support car/truck phones and mobile radio tele-
phones. The most successful 0G network was ARP (Auto-
radiopuhelin) which operated in Finland between 1971 and
2000. The network managed to reach 100% population
coverage by 1978 with only 140 base stations. The network
quickly became congested with high demand and so Nordic
Mobile Telephone (NMT) was introduced in 1981, this was a 1G
network. Congestion of 0G networks was an issue in many
areas including North American and most of Europe. Even-
tually the networks could no longer supply the high call vol-
umes. Nevertheless these networks highlighted the potential
success that a truly mobile phone and appropriate infra-
structure could achieve.
First generation (1G)
Prior to the introduction of the mobile phone there existed no
infrastructure that could properly support mobile communi-
cations and without this infrastructure the mobile phone
would have been useless. The only comparable system was
the 0G network mentioned above, but mobile phones did not
use these networks. For the mobile phone a pre-development
phase was needed in order to develop the necessaryB
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Fig. 5 e Mobile phone download band rates in Kbit/s from
1983 to 2012 [38e40].
i n t e rn a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 1 8 5e8 1 9 38188infrastructure to support their use. A mobile phone network
needed to be developed before mobile phones could be suc-
cessfully marketed to the public. The first network was the
first generation (1G) network; this was an analogue system
and was introduced on a wide scale in the 1980s. 1G networks
allowed for widespread voice communication within country
borders. The first networks became operational in 1979 in
Tokyo, Japan; European networks became operational in 1980
and America in Chicago, in 1977 (Kumar et al., 2010). This was
4e7 years after Motorola demonstrated the first mobile phone
in 1973; this first phone call was made using just one phone
mast and a short call was made locally. In 1984, 11 years after
the first mobile phone call and 7 years after investments into
infrastructure began, the first commercially available mobile
phone was released into the market, this was the Motorola
Dynatac. Astonishingly, this meant that infrastructure de-
velopers had to wait up to 7 years before they would see any
return on the substantial investments that went into estab-
lishing the infrastructure at this time. Even after the launch of
the Dynatac, mobile phone market penetration was still low
until the 1990s (Figs. 1 and 2). It was only when prices fell
below $1000 per unit (Fig. 4) that the number of subscriptions
began to increase. Many of the original 1G networks were
located in urban areas. Urban areas are centres of population,
trade and economy, so they are perfect areas for the imple-
mentation of innovations. By initially concentrating in-
vestments in high population density areas, a relatively large
proportion of the population could be covered with a limited
amount of investment. Examples of this were the US mobile
networks. In the US, Advanced Mobile Phone Systems (AMPS)
was first launched in Chicago. This first network covered an
area of 2100 square miles and comprised of only 10 base sta-
tions. Networks were then expanded from high population
density areas to more remote locations as consumer uptake
began to increase and were continually expanded so that they
would keep up with demand (Figs. 5 and 6).
These original networks were developed within individual
nations, thereby limiting usage to within the country’sM
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[13,47,48].boundaries. Although small in comparison with todays net-
works, these original networks were still expensive due to not
benefiting from economies of scale with large numbers of
users [41]. Early networks included Advanced Mobile Phone
System (AMPS), Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT) and Total
Access Communication System (TACS). AMPS became oper-
ational across most of the US in 1982.
In the US and Canada, 1G networks were launched by a
system of companies headed by Bell Telephone Company [42].
This was an advantage as it lowered the amount of invest-
ment and risk each firm was required to take in order to
implement the mobile network. Many of the companies
investing in these networks were providers of landline tele-
phones and radio communication companies. Crucially, mo-
bile phone companies, such as Motorola, were involved due to
their vested interest in increasing mobile phone uptake.
Motorola invested both time and money into network devel-
opment, inventing some of the technologies that networks
used and investing in network expansions. The original
network technologies were invented and patented by Motor-
ola [43].
Second generation (2G)
The second generation (2G) network was digital rather than
analogue; development began towards the end of the 1980s.
The original 2G networks were known as GSM, this still being
the most widespread network in the world in terms of area
coverage. GSM was established to allow for pan European
communication on a single digital cellular network. GSM
became operational in 1991, but GSM compatible handsets did
not really become available until 1992 [41]. Worldwide, 90% of
mobile phone users use GSM in their voice communications
[44]. GSM supported data services for the first time. It was
hoped that by the end of the 20th century 20 million users
would be signed up to GSM, the actual number exceeded 250
million. This was a remarkable achievement, since the GSM
standard had to overcome commercial, technical and culturalP
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border communications via mobile phones [45]. The standard
was originally developed for European use, but is now used
worldwide.
2G networks have been continually upgraded to cope with
increased demand. The first upgrade was to 2.5G also known
as GPRS and then to 2.75G also known as EDGE (Enhanced
Data rate for Global Evolution). The upgrade to EDGE began in
the US first in 2002 [41]. These evolutions took the mobile
phone network closer to the 3G networks that are widely used
today. GPRS and EDGE allowed for faster data communication
and enhanced Internet access. GSM was originally only
designed for voice communication. However, demand began
to shift frommainly voice and text communications to data as
well. GPRS and EDGE already made moves for the 3G network
to arrive [45].
Third generation (3G)
In 2002 demand began to shift from mainly voice and SMS
communication to increased data communication; network
operators responded to the demand and began looking into
increasing network capabilities, GPRS and EDGE being stop
gaps until this development could be completed. The 3rd
generation network became to be known as only 3G. The first
commercial network became available in Japan in 2001,
closely followed by South Korea in 2002 [45]. 3G allowed for a
substantial increase in data and voice communication ca-
pacities over previous networks [46]. 3G is far less well
distributed than the GSM network only covering around 11%
[41] of global distribution compared to 80% for GSM [44]. The
majority of 3G network users are in developed countries. In
the UK, 99.1% of mobile phone users have access to 3G from at
least one network provider [12].
Fourth generation (4G)
More than £2 billion is currently being spent by network EE to
roll out the new 4G networks across the UK. 4G is also known
as IMT-Advanced [40]. The 4G networks are all being launched
in urban and high population areas. In the UK, 4G is available
in London and surrounding areas, Cardiff, The Midlands,
urban areas in the North of England, Edinburgh, Glasgow and
Belfast. Only urban areas are being covered at present.Ve
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Fig. 7 e FCV Market share based on California’s Advanced
Clean Car program predictions of on-road light duty
vehicle fleet [49] and the infrastructure that will be required
in order to support this market entry.Predevelopment of infrastructure
The findings from the case study of the mobile phone have
been used to develop a scenario model for the introduction of
hydrogen infrastructure. Real data from the introduction of
the mobile phone and the development of its infrastructure is
shown Fig. 6. This data is partly taken from GSMA data, which
measures the Global Coverage of GSM networks [47]. For some
years before 1999 no data from GSMA is available, for these
years Nokia Siemens data was used [48]. This Nokia Siemens
data counts the number of networks in operation from 1991 to
present. The data was converted so that it would show pop-
ulation coverage. The Nokia Siemens data was cross-
referenced with the GSMA data for years where both datasets were available. This data was then extrapolated back
from 1999 to 1991 so that the level of population coverage
could be understood. Both sets of data only account for GSM
networks and not more advanced 3G or 4G networks. GSM
networks are by far the most wide spread globally accounting
for 90% population coverage.
From the mobile phone data it is clear that infrastructure
development predatedmobile phonemarket penetration. The
lag in time is between 3 and 5 years according to the data in
Fig. 6.
Predevelopment of hydrogen infrastructure
Based on the findings discussed throughout section 2 and data
shown in Fig. 6 implications can be drawn for the develop-
ment of a hydrogen infrastructure. The main conclusion is
that pre-development of infrastructure will be vital to the
market introduction of FCVs. The above data have been
applied to existing projections of FCV market share up until
2050. Two projections have been used. The first (Fig. 7) is based
on California’s Advanced Clean Car Program (CACCP) pre-
dictions [49]. These predictions represent a high level of
market penetration compared to other predictions. The sec-
ond scenario (Fig. 8) is based on the Department of Energy and
Climate Change’s (DECC) 2050 Pathways Report [50], this data
set represents more conservative predictions for FCV market
entry based on percentage of miles travelled by FCVs. The
secondary y-axis on Figs. 7 and 8 represents the percentage of
vehicle users who would need to have access to hydrogen
refuelling infrastructure so that the market predictions from
DECC and CACCP can be met. It is important that percentage
of vehicle users is used rather than percentage of the total
population. This is done so that the infrastructure numbers
relate properly to the FCV market share data, which also does
not measure FCVs in the entire population; the datameasures
the percentage of FCVs specifically within the automotive
sector. Access to refuelling infrastructure is defined as a
maximum travelling distance of 5 miles to a filling station.
The most outstanding message of the infrastructural
development scenarios is that hydrogen infrastructure
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Fig. 8 e FCV Market share based on UK DECC 2050
Pathways Report miles travelled by vehicle type [50] and
the infrastructure that will be required in order to support
this market entry.
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i n t e rn a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 1 8 5e8 1 9 38190developmentmust occur 3e5 years beforemarket penetration
of FCVs can be expected to occur. This 3e5 year lead-time is
instrumental in creating a market demand for FCVs, and is in
line with Melaina’s finding [51]. Both scenarios indicate FCV
market entry occurring in 2020 and reaching high market
shares by 2025, this wouldmean thatmeaningful investments
into a hydrogen infrastructure would need to begin by
2015e2017 and larger investments would be needed by
2020e2022. Without these investments the market uptake of
FCVs could be lower than is the UK DECC and CACCP
predictions.
If by 2050, according to California’s Advanced Clean Car
program predictions (Fig. 7), there will be 59% FCVsmaking up
the number of light duty vehicle on Californian roads we
would require 59% of the vehicle users to have access to
hydrogen infrastructure by 2045 and by 2047 at the latest.
Based on the DECC predictions of 20% FCV market share by
2050, 20% of the vehicle users would need access to hydrogen
infrastructure by the year 2045e2047 at the latest. Prior to
reaching these figures, continuous investments into hydrogen
infrastructure will be needed. In the first 3e5 years it is
probable that FCV market penetration would be at near 0%
with the only vehicles being in demonstration projects or a
small numbers of early adopters. The lack of existing markets
for FCVs is unavoidable and a market will not be able to grow
until some baseline hydrogen infrastructure has been con-
structed. The recommendation made here is that a 5-year
lead-time is the best strategy for hydrogen infrastructure
since this will lead to smoother market entry for FCVs. The
scenarios below are all based on this 5-year lead-time. If this 5
year lead time is not in place the level ofmarket penetration of
FCVs will lag behind the predictions from the DECC and
CACCP.
Now that the amount of infrastructure needed has been
defined it is important to consider what is meant by access to
infrastructure. FCV owners cannot be expected to travel 10s of
miles in order to reach a filling station. It is assumed that the
maximum theoretical distance travelled to reach a hydrogen
filling station would be 5 miles. This distance is based on astudy by Melaina and wouldmean that in the US it would take
a maximum 17min to a reach station (travelling at an average
of 25mph) [51,52]. Based on these figures a quick calculation
revels that to cover 100% of the UK we would need only 1198
hydrogen filling stations as an absolute minimum. This is
remarkably close to the 1150 stations suggested by UK H2
Mobility [53].
For California 100% coverage could be reached with 2085
filling stations as an absolute minimum. Figs. 9 and 10 show
the number of filling stations that would be required in the
California and the UK respectively. These numbers are based
on the DECC and CACCP scenarios. For California 21 filling
stations are needed by 2015, there are currently 9 accessible to
the public. For the UK where the number of vehicles is pre-
dicted to be lower 24 filling stations are needed by 2020. These
figures represent the absolute minimum number of filling
stations required to allow the numbers of vehicle users access
to a hydrogen filling station within 5 miles. It would be more
beneficial to have a greater number of filling stations to pre-
vent congestion and to give FCV usersmore filling options. It is
also clear that these stations would be located in strategic
locations so that they are accessible by a large proportion of
potential FCV users. Additionally is it important that the sta-
tions connect different areas of the country allowing for
intercity as well as intra city travel.
These absoluteminimumhydrogen filling station numbers
mean that for the UK there would be 14,000 FCVs per 1 filling
station. This would clearly be too high. The current ratio for
ICE vehicles to petrol stations is 4011 vehicles per 1 station
based on 34.5million vehicles on the roads [54] and 8600 filling
stations in the UK [55]. In California there is a ratio 3831 ve-
hicles per filling station, based on 31.8 million vehicles [56]
and 8300 filling stations [57]. Therefore it would be sensible
to increase the number of hydrogen filling stations by a factor
of at least 2 or 3 so that each filling station serves a similar
number of vehicles as petrol stations serve currently. This will
ensure demand for hydrogen is met. More appropriate
numbers of filling stations can be seen in Figs. 11 and 12.
Fig. 11 shows low, medium and high scenarios for the number
of hydrogen filling stations required to meet the FCV market
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Fig. 10 e FCV Market share based on UK DECC 2050
Pathways Report miles travelled by vehicle type [50] and
the number of hydrogen filling stations that will be
required in order to support this market entry.
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programme predictions of on-road light duty vehicle fleet [49].
Fig. 12 shows low, medium and high scenarios for the number
of hydrogen filling stations in the UK in order to support the
UK DECC 2050 Pathways Report [50] predictions for FCV mar-
ket entry. Careful selection of the locations of these stations
would obviously be crucial. Areas with a large number of po-
tential early adopters of FCVs would need to be targeted first
as well as areas with high proportion of vehicle users. This
paper does not look at specific locations of such filling stations
and there is clearly room for potential future work.
What these scenarios clearly illustrate is that there is an
urgent need to invest in hydrogen infrastructure in California
by 2015 and in the UK by 2020. Without this infrastructural
investment uptake of FCVs will be lower than what the cur-
rent scenarios are predicting. This would clearly be detri-
mental to the market uptake of FCVs. The 3e5 year lead-time
of infrastructural development resulted in the successful
introduction of the mobile phone. A 3e5 year lead-time of
could also be crucial to a successful market uptake FCVs.N
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Fig. 11 e Low, Medium and High scenarios for the number
of filling stations required in California to support FCV
market entry based on California’s Advanced Clean Car
program predictions of on road light duty vehicle fleet [49].Conclusion
Many developers of FCVs and hydrogen infrastructure are
experiencing a predicament. There is currently no market
demand for FCVs because there is no hydrogen infrastructure.
Further to this, infrastructure providers will not invest into a
hydrogen infrastructure because there is no demand from
FCVs. The only solution to this is to pre-develop a hydrogen
infrastructure in order to create a basis on which consumers
can use FCVs. Major investments into infrastructure can occur
in sync with market penetration, but initial infrastructural
investment must pre-datemarket entry of a new product. The
situation that exists today for FCVs existed 30 years ago for the
mobile phone. But mobile phone developers, telecom infra-
structure developers and telecom network providers eventu-
ally came together and jointly invested in the pre-
development of mobile telecom infrastructure to support the
mobile phone. The mobile phone would not have been as
successful as it is today without these early investments. The
organisations making the initial investments into mobile
networks were both communication providers and handset
OEMs. Today it is easy to see the rationale of OEMs investing
into infrastructure as handset market share is more than
double that of infrastructure providers market share within
the mobile phone industry (15% compared to 7% of revenue)
[58]. In this way investment into FC infrastructure should be
done in part by incumbent oil companies, existing hydrogen
producers but it is also important that automotive firms and
FCV developers, invest into the infrastructure that will sup-
port their products. Automotive OEMs are often reluctant to
invest into infrastructure, but they should learn lessons from
Motorola and realise that investments into networks can
result in increased revenue generation through increased
sales of their products. With a larger number of investors
involved in the introduction of a hydrogen infrastructure,
costs will be lowered and risks shared. Governments are keen
to see hydrogen infrastructure developed for environmental
reason, energy security and social reasons. Some projects
involving a large number of stakeholders are underway. The
UK H2 Mobility project brings in some of the stakeholders
mentioned above but does not include oil companies. The
i n t e rn a t i o n a l j o u r n a l o f h y d r o g e n en e r g y 3 9 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 8 1 8 5e8 1 9 38192recommendations made in this paper align with those made
by the UK H2mobility project. The project outlines a roadmap
to 1150 hydrogen filling stations covering the entire UK by
2030 [53]. These figures are in excess of the number of filling
stations suggested here, so would be sufficient to support the
market entry figures suggested by the UK DECC. If the H2
mobility project is a success it could result in the smooth
market uptake of FCVs in the UK.
The California Energy Commission in the USA awarded
funds for the construction of filling stations [59]. It is also
important that all of these stakeholders understand that a
return on their investment will not come quickly. It therefore
will seem counter intuitive for them to invest, in an economic
sense at least. Early investments may also serve to create a
positive brand image and companies may choose to market
themselves as ‘green’, which can lead to them generating
strategic advantages over competitors. The greatest danger, if
companies decide not to invest, is that they will suffer lost
revenue in the future due to not succeeding in market entry
with their innovations [60]. The suggestion of having auto-
motive OEMs invest into infrastructure is a divergence from
their current business models. This may not be appealing to
them, but if they want to see their FCVs enter markets it may
be the only sensible option.
One automotive firm, Tesla Motors, is already investing
into BEV recharging infrastructure to support the market
introduction of its own vehicles [61]. Supercharger stations
cost between $150,000 and $300,000 and there are currently 42
in the US and 13 in Europe [61]. This means that the networks
have cost between $8.25 and $16.5 million to date. FCV de-
velopers should learn from this and not be coy when consid-
ering investments into a hydrogen infrastructure.
An alternative method, although not the main recom-
mendation being made here, is infrastructure development
alongside centralised vehicle fleets. Fuel Cells are now seeing
widespread applications in a number of niche markets; in
both stationary and mobile power applications. One such
mobile power niche is material handling equipment. Large
fleets of forklift trucks are now in use [62]. These fleets are
used alongside an onsite filling station that provides
hydrogen. It may be possible for hydrogen infrastructure to
firstly develop in these niches. FCV fleets that operate from a
central hub could be operated using these centralised filling
stations. This type of operation would be most useful to
transport authorities and delivery companies, but could also
be used to support the introduction of FCVs to the general
public. This method would be less risky in terms of economic
investment as there would be a guaranteed customer base;
however, it is unlikely to facilitate a rapid increase in the
consumer uptake of FCVs. What could be more useful is if
these types of schemes were used as pilot and demonstration
projects. These could indicate the success of a seed hydrogen
infrastructure and convince FCV stakeholders to invest in a
predevelopment of infrastructure.Summary
There is currently a lack of commitment to the development
of a hydrogen infrastructure to support FCV market entry. Inorder to understand how to develop a hydrogen infrastructure
a historical case study of mobile telecommunication infra-
structural development was done. Mobile telecommunication
networks were successfully developed from scratch by a
consortium of companies beforemobile phoneswere released
to market. This predevelopment of the infrastructure was key
to the successful market uptake. The predevelopment lead-
time for the mobile phone networks to be built was between
3 and 5 years.
In order to allow smooth market entry of FCVs predevel-
opment of infrastructure will be critical. By investing into
hydrogen filling stations before FCVs are expected to enter
markets no delay should occur and market entry should pro-
ceed as it has been foreseen. It is suggested that a 5-year lead-
time is appropriate with a minimum lead-time of 3 years. The
issue still remains that pre-development will be an expensive,
time consuming and high-risk process. Individual companies
would not be willing to undertake such an exercise. This is the
reason that it is suggested that a hydrogen infrastructure is
developed by vehicle manufactures, hydrogen-producing
companies, existing oil companies and governments. This
will allow costs and risks to be shared by all stakeholders in a
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